https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-12-03/ ... r/10568398Mr Xi clearly wants to develop a Chinese ideology for the international order commensurate with China's growing influence. But he describes participation in global governance as an "achievement of the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation". The strong nationalistic undercurrent is unlikely to have the same appeal as the values of the current order.
What should America's allies conclude? That a Chinese-led international order is unlikely to be liberal.
It is likely to be an order in which China's interests alone dictate outcomes unmitigated by rules; in which the strong do what they may and the weak suffer what they must; in which tribute rather than alliance determines treatment; and in which military force is used to advance commercial advantage.
In short, it would be the equivalent of America's early 20th-century policy of United Fruit and gunboat diplomacy in Latin America. This is not an international order in which Western sensibilities would prosper. ...
What is so astonishing about the potential demise of the liberal world order is the extent to which it is consensual: the West encouraged and incentivised China's rise, provided its markets, its technology and its capital, and supported China's inclusion in rule-setting. ...
Western governments waited, perhaps too long, and were admirably slow to conclude that China did not want success on Western terms, but wanted instead to establish Chinese terms for imposition onto first neighbours and then, building from that power base, onto the West itself.
What happens next could be interesting. My feeling is that China, because of its centralised power structures, will deal more quickly and intelligently with changing circumstances than the West.
And change is certain. Either we will restructure the global economy in a very short time frame or climate change will do it for us - and it won't be nice.